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The world is currently still struggling with the aftermath 
of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. 
Following a description of the eruption, evolution and 
consequences of the global crisis, this paper reviews 
alternative hypotheses for the causes of the global 
financial crisis as well as their empirical evidence. The 
paper refutes the frequently voiced view that the global 
crisis was caused by global imbalances that reflected 
economic policies of East Asian countries. Instead, 
it argues that global imbalances were the result of 
excess demand in the United States, resulting from 
both the public debt in the United States arising from 
the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars and tax cuts and the 
overconsumption by households supported by the wealth 
effect from the housing bubble in the United States. The 
housing bubble itself was the outcome of the Federal 
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Reserve's low interest rate policy in the aftermath of 
the burst of the “dot-com” bubble in 2001, the lack of 
appropriate financial regulation, and housing policies 
aimed at expanding the mortgage market to low-income 
borrowers. It was possible to maintain the large trade 
deficits of the United States for such a long period of 
time because of the dollar’s reserve currency status. When 
the housing bubble in the United States burst, the global 
crisis ensued. The paper also analyzes why China’s trade 
surplus increased significantly in general and with the 
United States in particular in recent years, and argues 
that this increase was caused by both the relocation of the 
labor-intensive tradable sector of East Asian economies to 
China and high corporate saving rates in China as a result 
of its dual-track approach to reform. THE WORLD BANK GROUP 
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The Unexpected Global Financial Crisis 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
1.  The world is currently still struggling with the aftermath of the worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression. While a handful of economists predicted the crisis, it was largely 
unforeseen. As late as April 2007, the IMF in its World Economic Outlook concluded that risks 
to the global economy had become extremely low, and that, for the moment, there were no great 
concerns.  Despite  large  and  widening  global  imbalances  before  the  crisis,  optimism  on  the 
robustness of the world economy emanated from confidence in the United States‘ system of 
financial regulation, its financial and political system and the fact that it had the world‘s largest 
capital  markets.
2 Global imbalances were viewed as sustainable, given that  rapidly  growing 
developing economies needed a secure place to invest their funds for diversification purposes  
and increased global financial integration was deepening global capi tal markets and allowing 
countries to sustain higher debt burdens over the long term.  In addition, the U.S. was considered 
to  have  superior  monetary  policy  institutions  and  monetary  policy  makers.
3  Only  a  few 
economists did not share these views and expressed concern about a disorderly unwinding of 
rising global imbalances, as well as of the housing bubble.
4  
 
2.  The concerns of these economists were dramatically validated by the unfolding of the 
global  financial  crisis  since  September  2008.  The  coordinated  policy  response  by  the  G-20 
nations helped the world avoid a global depression. According to the IMF, these interventions 




3.  However, economic growth remains fragile. Recovery is taking place at two different 
paces: on the one hand, there are the high-income countries that are experiencing a sluggish 
recovery. On the other hand, there are the developing countries whose economic performance is 
far superior to that of the advanced countries. The recovery of the world economy is threatened 
by high unemployment in the advanced economies, high levels of sovereign debt and the crisis in 
                                                           
2 See Reinhart and Rogoff: “This Time is Different”, p. 214.   
3 Bernanke (2005a): “The Global Savings Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit”. Speech given at the 
Homer Jones lecture, St. Louis, Missouri.       
4 These economists included Nouriel Roubini; e.g., in “The Rising Risk of a Systematic Financial Meltdown: 
The Twelve steps to Financial Disaster”, February 5, 2008, online at www.roubini.com/analysis/44763.php. 
In addition, Raghuram Rajan, the Chief Economist of the IMF, warned of a collapse of the financial system in 
his Jackson Hole speech in August 2005.       
5“The State of Public Finances Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor; November 2009,” IMF Staff Position Note, 





6 Moreover, the severity of the recent global crisis has  highlighted the need to 
revisit basic policy recommendations, e.g., in the area of capital flows , the supervision of the 
financial  sector,  and  macroeconomic  management.
7    And  with  emerging  and  developing 
economies recovering from the global economic crisis much faster than advanced countries, it 
also reinforced a trend toward a new multi -polar world economy with several growth poles, a 
trend that had already become apparent before the crisis. 
 
4.  The  precise  genesis  of  the  global  crisis  remains  subject  to  debate.  While  global 
imbalances are widely viewed to have played an important role in its evolution, some economists 
consider them to be the primary cause of the crisis, while others view them as only facilitating its 
development.
8 A correct diagnosis of the genesis and driving forces behind the crisis is, however, 
important in order to draw appropriate conclusions to prevent its recurrence.  
 
5.  Section II describes the world economy before the crisis, and the eruption, evolution and 
consequences of the global crisis. Section III reviews alternative hypotheses for the causes of the 
global economic crisis as well as their empirical evidence.  We will refute the frequently voiced 
view that the global crisis was caused by global imbalances that reflected the export-oriented 
strategy of East Asian countries, the accumulation of international reserves for self-insurance 
motives by countries with surpluses, China‘s undervaluation of its exchange rate and the global 
savings glut. Instead, we will argue that global imbalances were the result of the large excess 
demand in the U.S. over an extended period—the financing of which was made possible by the 
reserve currency status of the US dollar.  This excess demand resulted from both the public debt 
in the U.S. arising from the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars, tax cuts and the overconsumption by 
households supported by the wealth effect from the housing bubble in the U.S. The housing 
bubble itself was the outcome of the Fed‘s low interest rate policy in the aftermath of the burst of 
the ―dot-com‖ bubble in 2001, the lack of appropriate financial regulation after the deregulation 
in  the  1980s  and  housing  policies  aimed  at  expanding  the  mortgage  market  to  low-income 
borrowers which was primarily a result of lobbying by the financial sector aimed at increasing 
profits through further deregulation. When the housing bubble in the U.S. burst, the global crisis 
ensued. Section IV discusses why China‘s trade surplus increased significantly in general and 
with the U.S. in particular in recent years. We will argue that this increase was caused by both 
the high corporate saving rates in China as a result of its dual-track approach to reform and the 
relocation of the labor-intensive tradable sector of East Asian economies to China, which started 
in the 1980s but accelerated after China‘s accession to WTO in 2001. Finally, the paper reflects 
on the lessons for policy prescriptions from the crisis.  
 
                                                           
6 Global Economic Prospects 2011.   
7 The need for changing the thinking and policy of macroeconomic management is discussed in the paper 
Beyond Keynesianism (chapter 3). 
8 See Portes (2009) and Krugman (2009) for the former hypothesis. Rajan (2010), Lin (2010), Roubini and 






II.  The World Economy before the Crisis  
6.  The global economic crisis that began in 2007 was largely unexpected. Just before the 
crisis, the IMF in its bi-annual World Economic Outlook announced that risks to the global 
economy had become extremely low, given that capital inflows pushed up borrowing and asset 
prices,  while  reducing  spreads  on  risky  assets.
9 Also, since 2000, the world economy had 
continuously expanded at high rates.  High growth of the world economy  was spread across 
advanced, emerging and developing countries and allowed unemployment and poverty to decline 
(Figure  1).  High  demand from fast-growing developing and emerging markets   led to high 







                                                           
























7.  Optimism on economic prospects and the sustainability of the strong growth performance 
also  emanated from the fact that the volatility  of the business  cycles in advanced industrial 
countries had been declining (Figure 2). On the one hand, recessions had a less severe overall 
impact and were of shorter duration. For example, the 1987 stock market crash in the U.S. did 
not cause a recession; also, the 1990–91recession was relatively short and shallow. Similarly, the 
burst of the ―dot-com‖ bubble had a relatively limited effect in the form of a mild recession and a 
sluggish recovery. On the other hand, expansions lasted longer. This success in stabilizing the 
business  cycles  has  been  referred  to  as  the  ―Great  Moderation‖,  defined  as  an  era  of  low 
inflation, high growth and modest recessions.




8.  The ―Great Moderation‖ was considered to be the result of several developments: for one, 
business and financial deregulation as well as financial innovation had created a more flexible 
and adaptable economic system. Financial assets were considered to be less risky than before, 
giving rise to higher levels of financial intermediation which in turn helped fuel growth as well 
as greater financial innovation, especially through hedge funds. Volatility of business cycles had 
also  declined  because  the  world  experienced  abundant  liquidity—partly  reflecting  surplus 
savings in a number of emerging markets—giving the false sense that stability was due to some 
structural improvement in the financial system. Also, growing globalization and free trade, partly 
                                                           
10 The term “Great Moderation” was coined by James Stock and Mark Watson (2002):  “Has the Business Cycle 












Figure 2: Standard Deviation of U.S. Gross National Product Growth
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; National Bureau of Economic Research, "The American 




boosted by China‘s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, as well as the buoyant 
growth of China and other newly emerging economies was expected to keep inflation at bay 
even as global growth accelerated.
11    
 
9.  Moreover,  many  economists  had  expected  that  economic  turbulences  in  one  country 
could not easily spread because decoupling had taken place to some extent. The decoupling 
thesis argued that the booming economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China would rely on 
domestic demand and would therefore not be affected by the meltdown of the subprime market.
12  
Also,  many  policym akers  were  not  aware  of  the  extent  of  inter-linkages  in  the  financial 
industries of Europe and the United States that contributed to the spread of the crisis. 
 
10.  Accompanying the period of strong expansion of the world economy was the emergence 
of significant global imbalances, characterized by large current account surpluses in East Asia 
and Europe and a widening current account deficit in the United States. Views on the importance 
of  these  global  imbalances  differed  sharply.  Some  economists  (such  as  Fred  Bergsten  and 
Miranda Xafa) viewed them as a threat to the world economy. In a testimony before the United 
States Congress, Bergsten (2007) stated: ―The global imbalances probably represent the single 
largest current threat to the continued growth and stability of the U.S. and world economies.‖ 
Similarly, Xafa (2007) argued before the crisis that ―The rising U.S. current account deficit has 
increased  concerns  among  policymakers  about  a  possible  abrupt  disruption  and  disorderly 
unwinding, involving a major sell-off of dollar assets, a sharp increase in US interest rates, and 
an associated sharp reduction in U.S. absorption. Such an abrupt unwinding of imbalances, 
triggered by a sudden loss of market confidence in the dollar, would obviously have negative 
spillover market effects on financial markets and the global economy.‖ Others (such as Bernanke 
2005a)  considered  imbalances  to  be  the  natural  outcome  of  the  underdevelopment  of  the 
financial system in developing countries which prompted sustained increases in the demand for 
U.S. dollar-denominated financial assets.  With asymmetries in the demand for financial assets 
between developing and emerging markets on the one hand and advanced economies on the 
other hand unlikely to disappear any time soon, this view considered global imbalances to be 




                                                           
11 Roubini and Mihm 2010 , p. 26-31.        
12 Roubini and Mihm 2010, p.115. The idea was first promoted by Jim O’Neil of Goldman Sachs, and then 
rapidly became the consensus. For example, in September 2008, German Minister of Finance Peer 





III.    Eruption, Evolution and Consequences of the Crisis 
Eruption  
 
11.  The  global  financial  crisis  erupted  in  September  2008  with  the  collapse  of  Lehman 
Brothers, largely as a result of accumulating defaults on mortgages and derivative products. The 
ensuing financial sector crisis quickly led to a significant decline in credit to the private sector as 
well as to a sharp rise in interest rates.  The resulting collapse in U.S. financial institutions led to 
a collapse of equity markets (Figure 3) and of international trade and industrial production and 
spread to other advanced economies as well as to emerging markets and developing countries. 
Real  growth  around  the  world  declined  sharply  below  projections  and  advanced  economies, 
including  the  U.S.,  entered  into  a  recession  (Figure  4).  Only  China  and  developing  Asia 



























































Source: World Bank, Global Economic Monitor database.Figure 4a: Regional Growth Rates 
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Figure 4b: Regional Growth Rates, Developing World 
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12.  By many measures, the impact of the crisis reached proportions never before seen in 
previous crises  in  modern history. The fall in  GDP, the collapse of world  trade, the rise in 
unemployment, the credit slump that followed and the plummeting of the stock markets were 
more severe than in any other crisis since World War II (Figure 5).   
 
Figure 5: Comparison of Global Crisis to Great Depression 
      Equity Markets                   World Output                     Trade Volume 
 
Source: Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2010).  
 
 




The evolution of the global economic crisis  
 
13.  How did the crisis evolve? At the nucleus of the crisis was the burst of the bubble in the 
U.S. real estate market. While house prices began falling precipitously only in the second quarter 
of 2007, the growth rate of housing prices had been declining since 2005.  In the late 1990s 
housing prices had begun to rise sharply and increasingly deviated from their fundamentals. 
Following their peak in April 2006, the bubble began to burst, also as a result of tightening of 
monetary policy by the Federal Reserve (Figure 6). With signs that the incessant rise in real 
estate was coming to an end, banks decided to end teaser rates on subprime mortgages and ask 
borrowers  of  the  so-called  ―NINJA‖  loans—i.e.,  loans  that  had  been  made  without  any 
declaration of income from the borrower—to start paying off debt.  However, as the downturn in 
house prices intensified, mortgage delinquencies, charge-offs and defaults accelerated (Figure 6). 
The liquidation of foreclosed housing further accelerated the decline in the real estate market. 
Banks that had overextended themselves on the housing market and were aware of a housing 
glut, drastically reduced offering mortgages and the housing boom ended. In a downward spiral, 
the decline in prices pushed more and more borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages to default, 
thus further endangering the position of banks and other financial institutions that had collected 
subprime  loans  securitized  through  new  instruments,  in  particular  Collateralized  Debt 
Obligations (CDO‘s).
13   
 
14.  The loss of value of CDO‘s led to large-scale sell-offs of these instruments and of assets 
that were somehow connected to these defaults.
14 This affected in particular hedge funds that had 
become highly leveraged, with the riskiest having a debt-to-equity ratio of twenty to one.   As a 
case in point, when in the summer of 2007 the market began to fear that subprime CDO‘s might 
lose much, if not most, of their value, two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns, which had invested 
several  billion  U.S.  dollars  of  short-term  loans  into  highly  illiquid  subprime  CDO  tranches 
started to lose most of their value. As a result, banks made margin calls and effectively withdrew 
the short-term financing upon which the hedge funds had relied. The collapse of those two funds 
portended the fate not only of hundreds of other hedge funds but also of the shadow banking 
system as a whole—consisting of financial institutions, such as money market mutual funds, 
mutual funds, and hedge funds, that perform the roles of banks, but are not regulated as such
 
(Roubini and Mihm 2010, p. 91).     
 
                                                           
13 See paragraph 74 for detailed discussion of these derivatives. 








15.  The first signs of a serious crisis had already emerged in late 2007, when as a result of 
growing defaults on mortgages a German and a British bank (IKB Deutsche Industriebank and 
Northern Rock, respectively) collapsed.  In response to these events, the Central Banks of the 
United States, European Union, Canada and Switzerland had in December 2007 announced a 
plan to provide at least $90 billion in short-term financing to banks and shortly afterwards the 
European Central Bank injected $500 billion into the financial system.   
 
16.  In March 2008, Bear Stearns filed for bankruptcy and was bought by JPMorgan for less 
than a tenth of its pre-crisis value. In September 2008, the crisis erupted with full force, when 
Merrill  Lynch,  Lehman  Brothers,  and  the  insurance  companies  AIG  and  HBOS  filed  for 
bankruptcy. Lehman Brothers‘ collapse was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. The collapse 
of Lehman Brothers and other banks and insurance companies happened largely as a result of 
their exposure to the bursting of the bubble in the real estate market.
15 The banks had a highly 
leveraged position that was vulnerable to a small decline in housing-related markets.  
 
17.  Lehman‘s  fall  led  to  a  complete  halt  of  credit  between  financial  institutions,  as  the 
uncertainty of their balance sheet positions made lending between them too risky (Figure 7). The 
sudden halt of intra-bank lending triggered a liquidity crisis as well as bank runs.  
                                                           




Figure 7: LIBOR-OIS Spread 
 
Sources: Bullard (2010), Financial Times, and Reuters. The LIBOR-OIS Spread (London Interbank Offer Rate - 
overnight indexed swap) measures the risk of default associated with lending to other banks.    
 
18.  The U.S. government quickly responded through a $700 billion bank bailout to rescue the 
financial sector from complete collapse as the leading financial institutions (banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds) faced bankruptcy. Under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) 
the US Treasury had the permission to insure or purchase up to $700 billion of commercial or 
residential  mortgage  securities  or  any  other  financial  instrument  related  to  them  to  promote 
financial  market  stability  and  encourage  banks  to  resume  lending,  both  between  banking 
institutions and to consumers and businesses.  AIG, the largest insurance company, was also 
saved  from  a  liquidity  crisis  by  an  intervention  from  the  Federal  Reserve  Board.  To  help 
financial institutions restore credit, the Fed lowered its effective rate to a nominal rate of almost 
0 percent. Shortly before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the government had already taken 
over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were in a difficult position given their operations as 










19.  The real economy was severely affected by the financial crisis. The recession affected 
first the financial system and the housing sector, but it quickly spread through the rest of the real 
economy. Consumer credit, which had been growing steadily during the boom years, fell sharply 
(Figure 8). Companies that had expansion plans could not raise the capital necessary to finance 
it. The number of new start-ups in the U.S. and worldwide fell considerably, as lending for new 
projects became too risky (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 8: U.S. Consumer Credit during the Crisis 
 

















Figure 9: One Year Growth in New Firms 
 
Source: Klapper and Love (2010). 
 
20.  The U.S. recession started in December 2007 and lasted for 18 months, when growth 
began slowly to pick up (Figure 10). The crisis brought about a jump in U.S. gross debt from 
62.2 percent of GDP before the crisis to 93.5 percent of GDP in 2010, largely reflecting a sharp 
downturn in tax revenue.
16 
                    Figure 10: U.S. GDP During the Crisis 
 
  
                                                           




21.  Demand fell across all sectors, but the decline was larger for goods than for services. 
Retail  sales  collapsed  as  uncertain  consumers  postponed  durable  goods  purchases  and  their 
holidays. The automotive industry observed a sharp fall in demand, which led to large-scale 
restructuring, with considerable job losses (Figure 11). Chrysler and General Motors filed for 
bankruptcy (in May and June 2009, respectively) and the U.S. Treasury rescued the companies 
by becoming equity shareholders, as part of the $787 billion fiscal stimulus package put in place 
by the U.S. government. 
 
 
22.  Capacity utilization rates fell sharply during the crisis. Starting in September 2008, the 
production and capacity utilization levels for manufacturing declined abruptly (Figure 12). As 
demand for durable goods collapsed, capacity utilization rates in manufacturing plummeted. The 
automobile sector was hit particularly hard, as its capacity utilization rates reached historic low 
levels, below 40 percent. The restructuring of most automobile companies was inevitable given 





















































Figure 11: U.S. Monthly Retail Sales






Figure 12: Capacity Utilization 
   
Source: Federal Reserve.   
 
23.  Employment levels declined precipitously in the goods-producing sector of the economy, 
while the services sector was more resilient to the crisis (Figure 13). Job losses in the American 
economy totaled more than 7 million jobs, almost 7 percent of total U.S. employment. The 
construction sector employed, at the trough of the crisis, almost 30 percent fewer people than at 
the beginning of the recession. 
 




24.  Unemployment rose nationwide, but its distribution was uneven across sectors, skills and 




even more drastic in states that had experienced a large housing boom, or in the rust belt where 
the  relative  size  of  manufacturing  is  important.  Unemployment  increased  more  for  workers 
without qualifications, as they were dominating sectors hit by the crisis (construction, leisure and 
transportation).  Average unemployment duration is still increasing, and the share of long-term 
unemployed has reached unprecedented levels (Figure 14).    
 
 




25.  The resulting recession in the U.S. quickly spread to other advanced economies as well as 

























a) Unemployment by Sector
Construction Manufacturing
Durable Goods Wholesale & Retail
Hospitality
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.




























b) Unemployment by Educational Level
Less than High School High School
Less than College College
National
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
















































c) Long Term Unemployment
National (left axis) Share Unemployed more than 27 weeks
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.




statistics demonstrate the depth of the crisis: in 2009, world GDP fell by 1.9 percent. In high 
income countries it fell by 3.4 percent (2.6 percent in the US, 5.2 percent in Japan, 4.9 percent in 
the U.K. and 4.3 percent in the EU). In emerging markets, GDP growth fell to about 0.5 percent, 
while  developing  countries  maintained  a  reasonably  good  growth  performance  of  above  4 
percent.  World trade in 2009 was around 65 percent lower than in the previous year (see Figure 
15). Equity markets collapsed (as shown in Figure 3). Unemployment around the world rose 
sharply (Figure 16). It surpassed 15 percent in countries like Spain and Greece that already had 
















































































































































































Figure 15: World Imports and Exports
World Exports Percent Change (right axis)










26.  The global slowdown in growth heightened vulnerabilities that had already been in place 
before the crisis. Notably, countries that had their own housing booms, like Ireland and Iceland, 
or had high fiscal deficits before the crisis, like Greece and Portugal, now teetered on the brink 
of a sovereign debt crisis and required support from the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
International Monetary Fund. At present, the fiscal crisis in peripheral Euro countries has already 
turned into a sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone, with potentially significant consequences for 
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Sources: International Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Regional Economic Outlook 
April 2011 and World Economic Outlook Database April 2011; International Labour Organization, 
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The spread of the crisis   
 
27.  What  were the channels that allowed the  crisis  to  spread?  One channel  was money 
markets. The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, made the short-term debt that 
it had issued effectively worthless, triggering panic among the various investors and the funds 
that held it. This panic resulted in a run on the money market funds that provided lending to the 
commercial  paper  market,  increased  perceptions  of  default  risk,  and  sowed  further  panic 
throughout  the global financial system (see also  Figure 7). Consequently, commercial banks 
significantly  decreased  lending  rates  following  concerted  efforts  by  central  banks  to  inject 
liquidity into the system.     
 
28.  In  addition,  letters  of  credit  and commercial paper  to  guarantee that  goods  in  transit 
between trading partners would be paid for when they reached the final destination were no 
longer available following the collapse of Lehman Brothers—resulting in the freezing of credit 
markets (Figure 18).
17 As a result, global trade came to a standstill.  At the peak of the crisis in 
early 2009, exports fell—on a year-to-year basis—by 30 percent in China and Germany, and by 
37 percent or even 45 percent in Singapore and Japan, respectively.   
 
 
29.  Also, while total remittances dropped only marginally, remittances from some groups of 
workers,  in  particular  migrant  workers  from  Central  American  countries  in  the  construction 
                                                           

































sector in the U.S. – who had been laid off in the wake of the crisis – stopped sending money 
home, causing a drop-off in aggregate demand in these countries, many of which were highly 
dependent on inflows (Figure 19). The drop in remittances caused a significant slide in growth in 
these Central American countries (see also Figure 4b). Furthermore, the tight relationship of the 
U.S. housing market and remittances to Mexico has become somewhat more tenuous, as workers 
shifted to other sectors (Figure 20).   
 








































Figure 19: Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean
Current US$, billions % of GDP (right axis)
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on International Monetary Fund balance of payments data, 




30.  A  further  factor  driving  the  international  contagion  was  the  collapse  in  international 
commodity prices, especially oil, as a result of the fall in demand in the advanced economies. 
This led to a serious fiscal crisis in most oil-exporting countries. As illustrated in Figure 21, oil 
prices had initially reached a real price, in 2005 dollars, of about $110 per barrel, up from $60 a 
year earlier. In the run-up to the crisis, the commodity price hikes further compounded the effect 
of the collapse in the financial sector and pushed these advanced countries further into recession. 
Loose monetary policy also triggered these commodity price increases, as it diverted demand 
away from U.S. Treasury bills.
18 In environments with tight commodity markets and declining 




                                                           






































































Figure 21: Real Price of Brent Crude
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; and U.S. Department of 




III.  What Was the Root Cause of the Crisis? 
 
31.  The  root  causes  of  the  crisis  are  subject  to  considerable  debate.  The  debate  largely 
revolves around the role of global imbalances, as well as the importance of domestic versus 
international factors in the emergence of the U.S. housing bubble.  This section tries to structure 
the two main competing hypotheses and assess supporting evidence.      
 
32.  All  attempts  to  explain the  global  financial  crisis  center  on  the  burst  of  the  housing 
bubble in the United States and differ on the role played by global imbalances in its genesis and 
their  cause.  The  first  hypothesis  argues  that  the  global  imbalances  were  brought  about  by 
economic  policies  of  East  Asian  economies,  including  their  export-led  growth  strategy,  the 
accumulation of international reserves driven by a self-insurance motive and the undervaluation 
of the Chinese exchange rate. The argument for the export-led growth strategy holds that East 
Asian  countries‘  systematic  promotion  of  exports  through  a  variety  of  macroeconomic  and 
microeconomic policies, including dumping, was crucial in creating the global imbalances. The 
self-insurance motive hypothesis argues that the desire of East Asian countries to accumulate 
international reserves as a protection against a repeat of their balance of payments crises in 1998 
– in which many countries were forced to request assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund – was a critical factor in creating the current account surpluses. Lastly, the perception that 
the  Chinese  authorities  were  maintaining  an  artificially  low  level  of  the  RMB  and  thereby 
supporting the country‘s export competitiveness has been repeatedly mentioned as a key factor 
behind  China‘s  rising  trade  surplus  and  global  imbalances.  All  three  types  of  policies  were 
credited with creating the global savings glut, which in turn was regarded as the key condition 
bringing about low world interest rates, unbridled growth in the financial sector and ultimately 
the housing bubble whose burst triggered the global financial crisis.   
 
33.  The second hypothesis argues that the emergence of the housing bubble in the U.S. was 
primarily homemade, reflecting the expansion of the mortgage market to low-income segments 
of the population, the loose stance of monetary  policy following the burst of the ―dot-com‖ 
bubble,  and  failures  in  the  regulation,  incentive,  design  and  structure  of  the  mortgage  and 
financial markets, including the rise of a shadow banking system largely outside the purview of 
bank regulators (e.g., Roubini and Mihm 2010).
19, 20 The overconsumption of households made 
possible by the wealth effect resulting from the housing bubble on the one hand and the public 
debts  brought  about  by  the  fiscal  policy  of  the  United  States  as  a  result  of  the  Iraq  and 
                                                           
19 Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010).  
20 For a similar view, see also Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010) who find that both global imbalances and the 
financial crisis originate primarily in economic policies followed in a number of countries in the 2000s 
(including in the United States)  and in distortions that influenced the transmission of these policies through 
U.S. and ultimately through global financial markets. Specifically, they argue that it was the interaction among 
the Fed’s monetary stance, global real interest rates, credit market distortions, and financial innovation that 




Afghanistan wars and the Bush tax cuts on the other hand led to large current account deficits in 
the U.S. These deficits could be financed because of the U.S. dollar‘s reserve currency status. 
This hypothesis essentially attributes the crisis to a range of policies pursued by the United States 
(monetary, fiscal, housing) that encouraged unsustainable overconsumption in the United States, 
triggering global imbalances and catalyzing the creation of the real estate bubble. The following 





III.1   Hypothesis I: Global Imbalances Led to the Housing Bubble and the Global 
Financial Crisis 
 
Policies of East Asian countries 
 
34.  As mentioned above, three types of policy choices of East Asian countries have been 
proposed as causes of global imbalances: (i) East Asian economies‘ export-led growth strategy
21; 
(ii) the self-insurance motivation for foreign currency reserve accumulation after the East Asian 
financial crisis
22; and (iii) China‘s exchange rate policy
23. All three policies have in common that 
they  create artificially high trade and current  account  surpluses  in  East  Asian countries:  the 
export-led  growth  strategy  through  microeconomic  and  macroeconomic  policies  aimed  at 
increasing exports;  the self-insurance argument as  a result of  the deliberate accumulation of 
international reserves by the Central Bank; and China‘s exchange rate policy by maintaining the 
exchange rate of the RMB to the U.S. dollar at an artificially low level. An export-led growth 
strategy has been pursued by the East Asian economies at least since the 1960s. If this hypothesis 
was true, it should have caused trade surpluses  from the time the strategy was pursued and 
should have caused other countries competing with East Asian economies‘ exports to reduce 
their trade surplus, possibly even resulting in trade deficits. If the self-insurance argument as a 
key explanation for global imbalances was accurate, global imbalances should be primarily the 
result of a rise in trade surpluses of countries that have accumulated reserves for the purpose of 
self-insurance and countries that do not have to be concerned about a balance of payments crisis 
because their currency is a reserve currency should not see a marked rise in their trade surpluses. 
Lastly, if China‘s exchange rate policy is to blame for global imbalances, the evolution of its 
external  surplus  should  be  correlated  with  changes  in  its  exchange  rate.  Moreover,  other 
developing countries competing with China‘s exports should have reduced their trade surplus or 
even encountered trade deficits.    
 
35.  East Asian economies’ export-led growth strategy:  Indeed, the trade surpluses in East 
Asian  economies  have  increased  dramatically  in  recent  years.  However,  the  East  Asian 
economies  had  already  adopted  an  export-led  growth  strategy  since  the  1960s.    In  fact,  a 
sustainable  export-led  growth  strategy  is  not  based  upon  targeting  an  ever-expanding  trade 
surplus, but rather on pursuing a continuously greater integration with international markets that 
leads to an expansion of both exports and imports, generating higher quality jobs in the tradable 
sector than before. Given that this type of strategy has been pursued for decades and led to a 
                                                           
21 Klein and Cukier (2009) exemplifies this argument. 
22 Aizenman (2008) and Aizenman and Lee (2008) provide evidence of self-insurance motives in East Asia.  
Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) also supports this viewpoint with a general model tested with Israeli data.   
23 Goldstein and Lardy (2009) offers a review of this viewpoint and argues that a 40 percent appreciation 
could eliminate China’s global current account surplus. Jeanne (2011) presents a model in which savings and 




secular increase in both exports and imports, it cannot possibly have been the root cause of large 





























































































































Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database; Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development National Accounts data files; Taiwan Statistical Databook; and World 





























































Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database; Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development National Accounts data files; Taiwan Statistical Databook; and World 





36.  The self-insurance motive: After the financial crisis in the late 1990s, emerging market 
economies in East Asia increased their current account surplus substantially and consequently 
experienced rising levels of international reserves. The self-insurance hypothesis argues that this 
rise in the international reserve position was primarily motivated by a desire to avoid recourse to 
international lenders in the case of a further balance of payments crisis, i.e., as an insurance 
against future contingencies and that these countries deliberately pursued policies to increase 
trade  surpluses  with  a  view  to  facilitating  this  reserve  accumulation,  hence  causing  global 
imbalances. However, the self-insurance motive is not a credible argument in that other countries 
like Germany and the Netherlands that do not have a need for self-insurance, given that their 
currencies  are fully convertible hard currencies, have  also  substantially increased their  trade 
surpluses and therefore also contributed to rising global imbalances (Figure 24). Attributing the 
emergence of growing global imbalances to the self-insurance motive would thus not explain the 
important role in the evolution of these imbalances played by the widening trade surpluses of 
other economies that do not have a self-insurance motive. Moreover, at more than $3 trillion, 
China‘s reserves are now well beyond what could be justified by a self-insurance motive. In fact, 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010) attribute the rise in reserves to hot money inflows as well as foreign 
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37.  China’s exchange rate policy has been blamed since 2003 as a root cause of global 
imbalances; the argument is that the Chinese authorities‘ objective to maintain the renminbi at an 
artificially low level in order to boost exports and reduce imports was the key reason for the 
build-up in global imbalances.
24 The bill co-sponsored by Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsey 
Graham in 2005, which called for a 27.5 percent tariff on all imports from China, is just one 
example of this type of claim. While the bill was later withdrawn, the sentiment it represents 
broadly corresponds to public opinion in the United States and other countries. However, those 
arguments are questionable:   
 
38.  First, the extent of over- or under-valuation of the renminbi is subject to considerable 
debate. Estimates of the undervaluation of the RMB vary to a significant degree and range from 
3 percent (Funke and Rahn 2005) to 50 percent (Ferguson and Schularick 2009). They are also 
highly  dependent  on  the  model  that  is  being  employed:  Most  empirical  calculations  of  the 
undervaluation rely on the theory of purchasing power parity (PPP), the theory that the same 
good  should  have  the  same  price  in  two  different  countries.  Although  this  is  an  intuitively 
appealing theoretical concept, it has proven to be unreliable in reality: prices are consistently 
lower in developing countries than in industrialized countries. At the same time, capital-intensive 
goods will be more costly to produce in developing than in developed countries. Some estimates 
aim  at  defining  what  the  RMB‘s  value  would  be  by  attempting  to  control  for  predictable 
divergences from PPP, but even such divergences are subject to a high degree of uncertainty.   
 
39.  Another approach is based on the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate method. It aims 
at assessing the extent to which an exchange rate would have to adjust in order to attain the value 
of the current account that is in line with its fundamental value.
25 Obviously, estimates will be 
highly subjective depending on the judgment about the fundamental value of the current account 
as well as the relationship between a change in the value of the exchange rate and the current 
account balance. Overall, there seems little consensus on the extent to which the  renminbi 
deviates from its equilibrium value.  
 
40.  Moreover, the theoretical underpinnings for an expected exchange rate appreciation of 
the RMB are unclear: one of the major theoretical foundations for the claim that the RMB is 
                                                           
24 For example, Paul Krugman (2010a, 2010b), argued that the undervaluation of the renminbi (RMB) caused 
the large US trade deficit and that the consequent Chinese purchase of US Treasury bonds lowered interest 
rates in the United States and caused the real estate and equity bubbles that subsequently led to the financial 
crisis. Low real interest rates also provided investment banks with a strong incentive to structure new and 
complex financial instruments that during the crisis helped to multiply the effect of failing mortgages 
throughout the entire financial system.  Also Lardy (2005): “Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy in China,” 
Cato Journal.    
25 The FEER was introduced by Williamson (1983): “Exchange Rate System—Policy Analyses in International 
Economics  5,” Institute for International Economics, Washington DC. For an application of the FEER model to 
China, see Wang (2004):  “Exchange Rate Dynamics,” in Eswar Prasad, ed.:  “China’s growth and integration in 




undervalued is the Balassa-Samuelson theorem. The Balassa-Samuelson theorem postulates that 
rapidly growing economies have a long-run trend of a real appreciation of the exchange rate.  A 
recent paper by Lin, Ju and Liu (2011), however, shows in a multi-sector model, that with large 
surplus labor in the traditional sector the real exchange rate of a rapidly growing country may not 
appreciate, until surplus labor has been depleted. Given China‘s continued abundant labor supply 
from  rural  parts  of  the  country,  the  fact  that  the  exchange  rate  has  not  been  appreciating 
significantly is thus not a sign of exchange rate manipulation.   
 
41.  More fundamentally, some economists (e.g., McKinnon 2010) argue that the effect of an 
exchange rate appreciation on the current account may be ambiguous.  In his view, the exchange 
rate plays little role in  the adjustment of the current  account,  as the current  account simply 
reflects savings-investment balances and these balances are determined by structural factors that 
may not be systematically related to the exchange rate. McKinnon argues that under financial 
globalization,  forcing  a  creditor  country  such  as  China  to  appreciate  its  currency  is  neither 
necessary nor helpful for reducing its trade surplus. The trade balance is by necessity equal to the 
difference  between  savings  and  investments,  but  savings  and  investments  are  related  to 
macroeconomic balances. Therefore, a focus on the exchange rate as determining savings and 
investments is misguided. For example, one cannot presume that U.S. net saving will rise when 
the U.S. dollar is devalued.  
 
42.  Moreover, if the undervaluation of the RMB was the reason for the global imbalance, we 
should see three empirical phenomena:  
 
  When the RMB appreciated by 20 percent in 2005-2008, the U.S. trade deficit with China 
should have declined. 
 
  The US‘s trade deficit with other countries competing with China should have declined, 
causing other countries to reduce their trade surplus. 
 
  China‘s trade surplus with other countries should increase.  
 
 
43.  First, the U.S.-China current account deficit increased constantly until 2007, despite the 
20 percent appreciation of the renminbi since 2005 (Figures 25 and 26). Partly, this reflected the 
fact that prices of U.S. imports remained unchanged—in spite of the appreciation of the RMB—
as the large and growing export share of Chinese producers gave them rising market power and 
allowed them to pass on the rising cost in dollars to wholesalers. 
26 At the same time, it would 
have been even more expensive for the U.S. to import from other countries than from China. In 
addition,  global imbalances  already began  to grow in 2002,  and China has been accused  of 
                                                           




causing the imbalance by sustaining a large undervaluation of its real exchange rate only since 
2003. Nevertheless, China‘s trade surplus did not become large until 2005, and its global trade 
surplus in 2003 was smaller than that in 1997 and 1998 (Figures 27 and 28). Interestingly, in 
1998, at a time when the RMB was still pegged to the U.S. dollar, China‘s currency was viewed 




















































Figure 25: Global Trade of China
Exports Imports Trade Balance Chinese Exchange Rate (right axis)






44.  Second, if indeed the undervaluation of the RMB was the main reason for the rising U.S. 
trade deficit and China‘s trade surplus, the trade deficit of the United States of other countries 
that compete with China should have declined. However, most other developing countries also 
increased  their  current  account  surpluses  and  reserves  substantially  in  the  same  period  (see 






































Figure 26: China-US Bilateral Trade
and Balance on Current Account
Exports of Goods and Services and Income receipts
Imports of Goods and Services and Income Payments
Balance on Goods and Services
Balance on Current Account
RMB Real effective exchange rate (right axis)


































Figure 27: Current Account Global Imbalances
United States Oil Exporters Germany and Japan OCADC
China and EMA Rest of World Discrepancy
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook.
Note: OCADC is composed of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain Turkey, and the United Kingdom.; 
EMA is composed of Hong Kong SAR, China; Indonesia; Korea; Malaysia; Phiippines; SIngapore; Taiwan, 







45.  Third, if indeed the RMB undervaluation was the main reason for the trade deficit of the 
United States and China‘s trade surplus with other countries – such as Japan; Korea; Taiwan, 
China;  and  Germany  –  China‘s  trade  surplus  with  these  countries  should  have  widened. 
However, to the contrary, China‘s trade surplus with other advanced countries turned into a 























Figure 28: Foreign Exchange Reserves of Developing Countries
Other Developing China Russia India Brazil





46.  The  above  evidence  shows  that  the  exchange  rate  does  not  seem  to  be  a  significant 
determining factor for the evolution of the U.S.-China current account deficit. Over the last 
decade, the rise in U.S. imports from China has been continuous and stable. Those slow trends 
are not affected by the depreciation of the U.S. dollar-renminbi real effective exchange rate in 
2001-2004,  or  by  its  appreciation  in  2005-2008.  Key  reasons  are  structural  changes  in  the 
economy of China and, related to that, of other Asian economies as well as US monetary and 
fiscal policies (as discussed in section IV).  
 
47.  The above three hypotheses  all imply that the  East  Asian  economies  are driving the 
global imbalances. If any of the three or the combination of all three represents the causes of the 
global imbalance, the share of the US‘s trade deficits with the East Asian economies in its total 
deficits  should  have  increased.  However,  while  the  United  States‘  trade  deficits  with  China 
increased substantially, the share of the U.S.  trade deficit with East Asian economies as a region 
actually  declined  significantly  (Figure  30).  The  above  evidence  indicates  that  the  three 











































 Figure 30: Average Share of Trade Deficit of East Asian Countries in U.S. Trade Deficit 
 




Global savings glut and interest rates  
 
48.  One of the most important channels through which global imbalances are considered to 
have caused the global economic crisis is through the impact on interest rates (Krugman 2009; 
Summers 2008). The hypothesis is that the global savings glut put extreme downward pressure 
on interest rates and thereby catalyzed the real estate boom in many countries and the risky 
innovations in the financial sector that were crucial to the global contagion of the financial crisis. 
However, recent research
27 highlights that the global savings glut or ―excess savings‖ may not be 
related to the downward pressure on world interest rates and the financing of the booms in those 
countries.  
 
49.  A  paper  by  Borio  and  Disyatat  (2011)  on  the  relationship  between  excess  savings 
associated with current account imbalances and world interest rates concludes that this link may 
be tenuous. The authors stress that only financial flows can have an impact on world interest 
rates. However, current accounts and net capital flows say little about financing, as they do not 
allow statements on the underlying changes in gross flows and their contributions to existing 
stocks, including the transactions involving trade in financial assets. As a result, current account 
imbalances provide little information on the role a country plays in international borrowing, 
lending and financial intermediation, about the degree to which its real investments are financed 
from abroad and about the impact of cross-border capital flows on domestic conditions.  
                                                           





















50.  Also,  the  link  between  current  account  balances  and  long-term  interest  rates  appears 
tenuous. For example, U.S. dollar long-term interest rates tended to increase between 2005 and 
2007 with no apparent reduction in either the US current account deficit or net capital outflows 
from surplus countries, such as China (Figure 31). Moreover, the sharp fall in U.S. long-term 
interest rates since 2007 has taken place against a backdrop of improvements in the U.S. current 




























                                                           
28 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010) also note that data do not support a claim that the proximate cause of the fall in 
global real interest rates starting in 2000 was a contemporaneous increase in desired global saving, given 
that global saving fell between 2000 and 2002 by 1.8 percent of world GDP and aggregate global saving rose 







Figure 31: Global Current Account Balance and Net Capital Flows 
 




Figure 32: U.S. Current Account and Financial Variables
 










51.  Moreover, the link between the U.S. current account deficit and global savings appears to 
be weak. While the deficit began its trend deterioration in the early 1990s, the world savings rate 
actually trended downward toward the end of 2003. In contrast, the stabilization and reductions 
in the U.S. current account deficit since 2006 have occurred against the backdrop of a continued 
upward drift in emerging market saving rates (Figure 33). 
29 Furthermore, there does not seem to 
be a clear link between the global savings rate and real  interest rates or term premia. Both real 
world long-term interest rates as well as term premia have trended downward  irrespective of 
developments in the global saving rate.      
 
 
Figure 33: Global Savings Rate, Interest Rates, and GDP Growth
 
Sources: Borio and Disyatat (2011); International Monetary Fund; and Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
 
52.  Doubts on the impact of the global savings glut on the housing bubble in the United 
States are also raised by Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010). The authors show that global savings 
rates did not show a robust upward trend during the period of the expansion of the bubble. 
Moreover, if there had been a global savings glut there should have been a large investment 
boom—to the tune of at least 4 percent of GDP—as U.S. households should have chosen to 
invest a substantial share of those funds to help make the interest payments.  However, the U.S. 
investment rate did not rise between 1995 and 2005, and in 2005 ended only 1.6 percentage 
points  higher  than  in  1995.    Moreover,  when  Bernanke  formulated  his  global  savings  glut 
hypothesis, the investment rate was lower than in 1996.  In fact, there was no investment boom, 
but a consumption boom (Figure 34).    
                                                           
29 The point about falling interest rates coinciding with a falling global savings rate is also made by Laibson 





53.  To summarize, there is considerable evidence that the global savings glut did not cause 
the global imbalances.   
 
III.2  Hypothesis II: U.S. Policies Led to the Housing Bubble, Global Imbalance and the 
Global Financial Crisis 
54.  Instead,  it  appears  that  global  imbalances  reflected  policies  and  structural  factors 
affecting savings in the United States. Lin, Dinh and Im (2010) argue that the housing bubbles 
were triggered by the Fed‘s low interest rate policy following the burst of the ―dot-com‖ bubble 
in 2001 and magnified by the financial deregulation in the 1980s, which will be discussed later. 
In combination with a range of policies aimed at expanding the availability of mortgages to low-
income borrowers in the subprime market, the above policy changes led to excessive risk-taking 
and higher leverage, resulting in excess liquidity, and ―bubbles‖ in both housing and equity 
markets in the United States. The wealth effect of these bubbles enabled US households to over-
consume, which, together with the public debts arising from the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars and 
a range of tax cuts, increased the United States‘ current account deficits.  If this hypothesis is 
correct, a causal link needs to exist between monetary, fiscal and housing policies of the United 
States, and its large and growing current account imbalance.       
 
55.  The  Fed‘s  monetary  policy  had  been  loose  from  the  1980s  and  turned  extremely 
expansionary when the burst of the technology bubble in early 2000 caused a recession. In the 
run-up to the bubble‘s burst, and as stock prices continued to rise, the Fed did not intervene. 



































































































































































































































































































Figure 34: US Real Consumption Expenditures




consumption and economic activity falling and the economy heading toward a recession, the 
U.S. Federal Reserve adopted an aggressive monetary policy to mitigate these effects, reducing 
the funds rate 27 times from 6.5 percent in March 2001 to 1 percent in June 2003 (see Figure 35 
for the evolution of the Federal Funds rate).
30 Testifying before Congress on July 15, 2003, 
Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Alan  Greenspan  stated  th at  the  economy  was  not  ―showing 
convincing signs of a sustained pickup of growth,‖ such that a further interest rate easing could 
encourage growth without ―ultimately stoking inflationary pressures‖.  Other events in the U.S. 
also contributed to the Federal Reserve‘s decision to maintain the low interest rate policy. For 
instance, after the 9/11  terrorist attacks, U.S. stock markets responded with a sharp decline, 
raising concerns about the health of the U.S. economy after the terrorist attacks. As a result of the 








56.  The Fed‘s monetary policy and low interest rates had a significant impact on the housing 
market. A 2008 paper by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis finds that ―monetary policy has 
significant  effects  on  housing  investment  and  house  prices  and  that  easy  monetary  policy 
designed to stave off the perceived risks of deflation in 2002-2004 has contributed to a boom in 
                                                           
30 Rajan (2010).   
31 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the 2001 recession lasted 8 months from March 2001 to 
November 2001 (shorter than the average duration of a recession in the US in the post-war era). 
32 The expansionary stance of monetary policy, however, does not explain why real interest rates stayed low 
after the expansionary monetary policy was scaled back after 2004.  One of the factors explaining the 
persistence of low interest rates may also be the substantial asset reallocation from equities to fixed income 
instruments during and after the bursting of the tech bubble. This trend was further enhanced by the decision 
of monetary authorities to invest in US treasuries (e.g., the People’s Bank of China, Japan and other countries 
as shown also in Figure 25). Also, global asset scarcity caused by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 
contributed to a fall in US interest rates.  Also, there was a growing consensus that the developed economies 





















































































































































































Figure 35: Long-term Effective Federal Funds Rate




the  housing  market  in  2004  and  2005.
33 Specifically, the Fed kept pursuing loose monetary 
policy, even while it gave assurances to the markets on its willingness to maintain easy monetary 
conditions and to step in to provide liquidity in case the financial markets had problems, t he so-
called ―Greenspan put.‖
34 These assurances, along with a range of housing policies discussed in 
further detail below, helped to boost lending significantly, including to creditors who were barely 
creditworthy. 
35 As noted by Rajan (2010), ―Sustained easy monetary policy that is maintained 
while  jobs  are  still  scarce  has  the  effect  of  increasing  risk  taking  and  inflating  asset-price 
bubbles,  which  again  weaken  the  fabric  of  the  economy  over  the  longer  term.‖  Household 
borrowing went up from 66 percent of GDP in 1997 to 100 percent of GDP a decade later.  The 
protracted period of low short-term policy interest rates in combination with financial innovation 
also lowered long-term interest rates as a result of  low inflationary expectations and a perceived 
decline in the riskiness of financial assets, and  led to a situation of excess liquidity which 
supported an incipient housing boom since 2002 (Figure  36).  
 
                                                           
33 Jarocinski and Smets (2008):  319-65.    
34 A term coined by the Financial Times in an article of January 4, 2001, which referred to Greenspan’s 
statement that the Fed would intervene ex post to smoothen the effects of the burst of a bubble, but could not 
know ex ante about it.        
35 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010) also note that the overly accommodative stance of the Fed’s monetary policy 










































Figure 36:  Changes in US Housing Prices by the S&P/Case-Schiller Indices




57.  Real estate and equity investment increased rapidly, and the housing boom turned into a 
bubble, with housing prices reaching well beyond what economic fundamentals would otherwise 
indicate.
36 The increased availability of mortgages led to a departure of the housing prices from 
fundamentals. Between 1997 and 2006, the price of the typical American house increased by 124 
percent. During the two decades ending in 2001, the national median home price ranged from 2.9 
to 3.1 times median household income. This ratio rose to 4.0 in 2004, and 4.6 in 2006.
37 Schiller 
in his article on ―Irrational Exuberance‖ shows how far housing prices deviated from what would 
have been suggested by economic fundamentals (Figure 37). 
 
 
                                                           
36 World Economic Outlook, October 2008 (Chapter 1), International Monetary Fund. According to the WEO: ―The 
countries  that  have  experienced  the  largest  unexplained  increases  in  house  prices  over  the  past  decade  are 
Australia, Ireland, and the United Kingdom; house prices in these countries were 20 to 30 percent higher in 2007 
than can be attributed to fundamentals. A group of other countries -including France, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Spain- have house price gaps of between 10 percent and 20 percent. The gap estimate for the United States –per 
about 7 percent- is smaller than for most other countries and has been narrowing compared with earlier estimates, 
partly reflecting the decline in U.S. house prices over the past 18 months.‖ 


































































Figure 37: Home Prices and Economic Fundamentals
Home Prices
Building Costs
Population Real Interest 




58.  In general, housing and real estate property represent an important share of household 
wealth in total household net worth.
38 Wealth effects from the real estate market and the recovery 
of  the  equity  market  made  households  feel  richer,  and  hence,  consume  more.  Financial 
innovations allowed households to refinance their mortgages, and capitalize their wealth gains in 
the housing markets.  
 
59.  Consumption, as well as household debt, increased rapidly during this period. Figure 38 
shows that in 2001, U.S. household debt as a percentage of household disposable income was 
100 percent. By 2007, it had increased to 132 percent. This 32 percentage point increase in 
household debt was mainly used to support household consumption. The boom was not only 
limited to the housing market. The U.S. stock market also increased by more than 50 percent 
from June 2003 to October 2007.
39  Figure 39 shows the evolution of house holds‘ net worth 
relative  to  disposable  personal  income.  Disposable  personal  income  has  been  constantly 
increasing over 1986-2009. However, net worth fell from 1999-2002 to rise again from 2002-
2006.  Hence,  during  2002-2006  households  saw  their  wealth  increase  as  a  consequence  of 
soaring housing and equity markets.  
 
 
                                                           
38 Data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States of the US Federal Reserve indicate that the share of 
real estate in total net worth for households and non-profit organizations was less than 30% in 2000, peaked at 40% 
in 2005 to drop to 37% and 34% in 2008 and 2009 (Q3), respectively. 



















































































Figure 38: Household Debt as a Percentage of Personal Disposable Income






60.  Greenspan  and  Kennedy  (2008)  show  that  the  increase  in  housing  prices  contributed 
substantially  to  the  consumption  boom,  primarily  via  home  equity  loans  and  mortgage 
refinancing cash-outs. Empirical evidence for the link between housing wealth and consumption 
is found by Bostic et al. (2006), which uses micro-data to estimate the elasticity of consumption 
to both housing and financial wealth in the United States over the period 1989-2001. They find a 
substantially larger marginal propensity to consume from housing wealth than from financial 
wealth. In addition, Case et al. (2005), using panel data for 14 countries, report: ―The importance 
of  housing  market  wealth  and  financial  wealth  in  affecting  consumption  is  an  empirical 
matter….[] We find at best weak evidence of a stock market wealth effect. However, we do find 
strong  evidence  that  variations  in  housing  market  wealth  have  important  effects  upon 
consumption. [The results…] support the conclusion that changes in housing prices should be 
considered to have a larger and more important impact than changes in stock market prices in 
influencing household consumption in the U.S. and in other developed countries.‖                 
 
61.  Equity can be extracted from houses through three channels: (i) free cash available to 
home sellers, which is equal to the value of existing home sale minus mortgage debt paid off at 
the time of sale and closing costs; (ii) home equity loans
40, which are equal to originations minus 
repayments resulting from other forms of equity extraction, and (iii) cash-out refinancing, which 
is refinance originations minus repayments of first liens resulting from refinancing.   Greenspan 
                                                           
40 Home equity loans are a type of loan in which the borrower uses the equity in their home as collateral. A 































Figure 39: U.S. Household Disposable Income and Net Worth
Disposable personal income
Net Worth of Households and Non-profit Organizations
Household net worth as percentage of disposable personal income





and Kennedy (2008) estimate that during the 1991-2006 period, free cash resulting from these 
liquidity channels alone averaged about $590 billion annually. Equity extracted through sales of 
existing homes accounted for about two-thirds of total free cash; home equity loans accounted 
for close to 20 percent; and cash-out refinancing about 13 percent.              
 
62.  The nexus between the asset price boom, consumption and the current account balances 
is studied empirically in a model by Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010). The authors find that asset 
price  movements  explain  a  substantial  share  of  the  cross-sectional  variation  in  international 
financial  flows  (Figure  40).  Using  regressions  with  real  housing  price  appreciation  as  the 
independent variable and the accumulated balance of trade as the dependent variable, they find 
for a sample of 18 OECD countries plus China that movements in residential home prices alone 
explain around 50 percent of the variation in accumulated current account deficits.  The authors 
acknowledge that their regressions do not answer the question of causality; they point, however, 
to  some preliminary  evidence showing  that the causality  runs from asset  bubbles to  current 
account deficits, notably the fact that the consumption boom was largely financed by loans taken 
out on real estate.  
 
Figure 40: Housing Price Appreciation vs. Balance of Trade Accumulation, 
1996 to peak of housing market 
 
 Source: Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010). 
 
 
63.  One  additional  factor  contributed  to  the  large  U.S.  current  account  deficits:  the  U.S. 
public sector dis-saving. The wars in Afghanistan starting in 2001, and in Iraq, starting in 2003, 




effects of the recession on tax revenue, turned the U.S. government budget from a surplus of 
almost 1 percent of GDP in 2000 to a deficit of 4.5 percent
41 of GDP in 2008 (Figure 41). All 
else equal, this increase in the budget deficit implies a fall in public sector savings and national 
savings, and a corresponding swing of 5.5 percentage points of US GDP in the current account.  
 
 
64.  To summarize, loose monetary policy that was enacted to counteract the burst of the I.T. 
bubble and the 9/11 attacks created conditions of excess liquidity in which the housing and 
equity bubble could develop. This bubble increased households‘ wealth and consumption. As a 
result, the U.S. economy boomed. However, U.S. domestic production was not able to meet the 
increase in domestic consumption, which led to current account deficits with countries providing 
consumer goods to the U.S., including oil-exporting countries and consumer goods-exporting 
countries.  As  China  had  become  the  major  producer  of  labor-intensive  processed  consumer 
goods by 2000, the United States ran an increasingly large deficit with China, which in turn ran 
trade deficits  with  many  other  East  Asian economies  that provided intermediate products  to 
China.   
                                                           





















































































































P Figure 41: US Budget Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits
Surplus or Deficit(−) Receipts Outlays




65.  The above-mentioned loose monetary policy and low short- and long-term interest rates 
not only helped bring about the housing bubble in the U.S., but also encouraged aggressive 
search for higher yields on a global scale reflected in record high volumes of capital flows to 
developing countries, which rose from $200 billion in 2000 to $1.2 trillion in 2007 (Figure 42). 
Large capital flows to developing countries are also attributable to the deep structural reforms in 
many developing countries that were undertaken during the 1990s and contributed to record-high 
investment-led  growth  in  many  developing  countries  in  the  same  period  (Figure  43).
42 The 
accelerated growth in many countries resulted in a sharp increase in  the demand for (and prices 
of) natural resources, as well as trade surpluses in natural resource -exporting countries. This 
prompted a boom in commodity prices ,  which in turn further accelerated gro wth in natural 
resource-exporting developing countries (Figure 44). The investment-led growth in developing 
countries resulted in large trade surpluses in many advanced capital -goods exporting countries, 
such as Germany.  Since the United States is the res erve currency issuing country, the foreign 
reserves accumulated through trade and capital account surpluses in other countries will return 
back to the U.S., in the form of purchasing Treasury bills or other investments, and this led to the 









                                                           
42 The Global Economic Prospects of  2010 notes that the fall in borrowing costs during the 2003-07 period 
was associated with almost 70 percent of the increase in  capital flows  into developing countries and 80 
percent of the increase in domestic consumption. Also, on average, between 2000 and 2007 investment-to-
GDP ratios in developing countries increased by 5.2 percentage points compared with their 2000 levels. The 
GEP also indicates that more than half of the 1.4 percentage point increase in potential output growth rates in 
developing countries between 2003 and 2007 is directly attributable to the capital deepening during this 
period.               
43 Most scholars emphasize the high demand for US treasuries from trade surplus countries allowed the U.S. 
government to borrow more cheaply than otherwise, a phenomenon often referred to as the “exorbitant 
privilege” (Eichengreen 2010). However, more important than this privilege, is that as long as the US dollar is 
an accepted reserve currency, the funds to support the trade deficits will recycle back to the US either by 
purchasing treasury bill or other forms of investments and become US’s capital account surplus to offset the 
current account deficits. This may appear that the investors have a preference for the US dollars (Bernanke 
2005a, Bernanke et al. 2011). But in fact it is because the U.S. dollar is a reserve currency that the current 




Figure 42: Total Capital Inflows to Developing Economies 
 




Figure 43: Trend and Cyclical GDP Growth 
       
 









Figure 44: Selected Commodity Prices 
 












































































































66.  Aggregate demand pressures emanating from the accommodative monetary policy were 
initially reflected in oil and other commodity prices, and finally led to an increase in headline 
inflation.  The  consequent  tightening  of  monetary  policy  resulted  in  a  correction  of  housing 
prices, triggered defaults on subprime loans, large losses for banks and financial institutions, 
sharp  increases  in  risk  aversion  and  complete  lack  of  confidence  and  trust  among  market 
participants,  and  substantial  deleveraging and large capital  outflows from  emerging markets.  




III.3 Financial Deregulation, the Housing Bubble, and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
67.  The expansionary monetary and fiscal policy of the United States was the key factor in 
the emergence of the global imbalances. However, it was housing and financial sector policies 
aimed  at  expanding  the  mortgage  market  to  borrowers  that  had  up  to  that  point  not  been 
considered creditworthy—the evolution of the so-called subprime mortgage market—and the 
financial innovations to support the subprime mortgages that were the primary causes for the 
burst of the bubble which had such a large unexpected systemic effect.  Notably, the emergence 
of  new  financial  instruments  and  derivatives  initially  seemed  to  lower  the  risk  profile,  but 
ultimately turned out to increase it substantially.  As a result, when the housing bubble burst, the 
new financial innovations also led to a systemic financial crisis in the U.S. and the world.  In this 
section, we will review the evolution of U.S. financial regulations and housing policies, as well 
as how the financial innovations led to the unexpected systemic risk. 
 
68.  Starting in the 1970s, U.S. government policy had emphasized deregulation to encourage 
business, which resulted in less oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about 
new activities undertaken by banks and other evolving financial institutions. One of the first 
steps in this direction was the creation of Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs). MMMFs had 
been established in response to interest rate ceilings on demand deposits (Regulation Q) and did 
not have restrictions on interest rates. A key regulation supporting the growth of the MMMFs 
was  the  Garn-St.  Germain  Act  of  1982,  which  authorized  banks  to  issue  short-term  deposit 
accounts with some transaction features, but no interest rate ceiling, thus effectively bypassing 
Regulation Q. While the Garn-St. Germain Act was intended to benefit the thrift industry (the so-
called Savings and Loan associations largely aimed at financing real estate), it also allowed these 
firms to embark on types of financial transactions with new and higher risks.   
 
69.  Savings  and  loan  (S&L)  associations  specialized  in  taking  deposits  with  short-term 
maturity  and  making  mortgage  loans  with  long-term  maturity.  This  asset-liability  mismatch 




increased interest rates to combat inflation in the late 1970s, most thrift institutions reported 
large losses. By 1982, the net worth of the entire industry approached zero. As a result, many 
institutions failed, but no large-scale action was taken, partly because of lack of funds at the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, as well as inadequate banking supervision by 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
44 
 
70.  Notwithstanding these signs of increasing financial distress, the S&L industry underwent 
rapid expansion between the years 1982 and 1985. The reason was that investors saw substantial 
potential  for  profits  in  the  new  investment  powers  granted  to  thrifts,  and  invested  in 
condominiums and other commercial real estate.  Consequently, the investment portfolio of S&L 
associations shifted away from traditional home mortgage loans into higher-risk loans. These 
loans were funded by the rapidly growing supply of deposits that were attracted through above- 
market interest rates.  
 
71.  However, by the mid-1980s the boom in real estate went bust, partly as a result of the 
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated many of the tax shelters that had made 
real estate an attractive investment in the first place. As a result, many deposits were withdrawn 
and hundreds  of institutions  failed. The subsequent  bailout  of the savings  and loan industry 
proceeded for several years and cost about $210 billion.   
 
72.  The rise in  increasingly risky financial transactions  went  hand in  hand with  growing 
consolidation in the financial industry.  Banks realized that their prospects of being bailed out by 
the government, in case their increasingly risky businesses failed, rose dramatically the larger 
they had become—meaning they became ―too big to fail‖. Consequently, since the early 1990s 
they absorbed other banks as a way to become more immune against risks.
45 Between1990 and 
1998, the number of banking institutions decreased by 27 percent as banks continued to merge. 
An important legislative step in support of greater banking consolidation was the Riegle -Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which eliminated previous restrictions 
on interstate banking and branching.
46 
 
73.  An even more important legislative step encouraging the adoption of riskier financial 
products  in  the  financial  industry  was  the  repeal  in  1999  of  the  Glass-Steagall  Act  and  its 
replacement by the Gramm-Bliley-Leach Act. This repeal essentially eliminated the separation 
between commercial banks (which had traditionally conservative policies) and investment banks 
                                                           
44 Sherman (2009).    
45 Mallaby (2010): p. 11.  
46 One example of consolidation occurred in April 1998 when Travelers Insurance Group and Citicorp, the 
parent of Citibank, announced plans to merge and form Citigroup, Inc, taking in the combination of banking 
and securities dealing.  Albeit not entirely compliant with the spirit of the Glass-Steagall act, bank executives 




(which had more of a risk-taking culture).
47 As a result of the adoption of the Gramm -Bliley-
Leach Act, large banks could be a commercial bank, an insurance company, an asset  manager, a 
hedge fund and a private equity fund at the same time. Consequently, banks with access to 
deposit insurance and Central Bank support pursued high -risk activities, thus endangering the 
soundness of the financial system as a whole. 
 
74.  Also, in 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission relaxed the net capital rule 
which enabled investment banks to substantially increase the level of debt they could assume, 
fueling the growth in mortgage-backed securities supporting subprime mortgages. Mortgage-
backed securities became increasingly popular in the 1980s; but it was not until the 1990s that 
they really took off. These securities include Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDO‘s) and Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLO‘s), as well as CDO‘s of 
CDO‘s  of  CDO‘s  (CDO3)  which  assembled  a  bunch  of  credit  default  swaps  to  mimic  an 
underlying CDO.
48 These new instruments assembled a multiplicity of tranches, each of which 
represented a certain level of risk tolerance. They a nd the risk they implied became difficult to 
value; as a result, the financial system became prone to a high level of risk. The lack of 
transparency associated with financial innovation through securitization allowed even quasi -
public institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and prospective borrowers to avoid careful 
scrutiny. In this context, it became increasingly common for borrowers to misrepresent their 
income and to fail to provide written confirmation about their salary (the so -called NINJA 
loans).  
 
75.  Unlike stocks, bonds and options, there was no clearinghouse for trades in most of the 
new  derivative  instruments.  Moreover,  the  Commodity  Futures  Modernization  Act  of  2000 
ensured that derivatives remained unregulated. In such conditions, derivatives trading expanded 
quickly, increasing from a total outstanding nominal value of $106 trillion in 2001 (1039 percent 
of U.S. GDP, and 331 percent of world GDP), to a value of $531 trillion in 2008 (3688 percent 
of  U.S.  GDP  and  868  percent  of  world  GDP).
49   However, the legal and technological 
infrastructure of the industry was inadequate to handle such an explosion of the volume of 
derivatives, which worsened the impact of the lack of regulation of derivatives.
50 
 
76.  The  development  of  mortgage-backed  securities  was  largely  driven  by  the  shadow 
banking system (Figure 45), which experienced dramatic growth in the run-up to the crisis. The 
growth of the shadow banking system was partly the result of the perceived decline in the profit-
                                                           
47 Roubini and Mihm (2010): p.74.   
48 CDO’s essentially bundled high-risk subprime mortgages and then sliced them into tranches (equity, 
mezzanine and senior). Purchasers of the equity tranche had the highest return and highest risk, while 
purchasers of mezzanine and senior tranches had correspondingly less return and less risk.  If any 
homeowner in the underlying pool defaulted, the holders of equity tranches would see the highest loss.        
49 Bank of International Settlements, Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics at end-June 2011.    




making opportunities of traditional commercial banks that faced competition from nonbanks and 
their products, such as junk bonds and commercial paper. As a result, commercial banks began 
exiting the regulated sector.
51 The shadow banking system included nonbank mortgage lenders, 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits, investment banks and broker dealers, money 
market funds, hedge funds and private equity funds and state - and local government-sponsored 
pools of auction-rate securities and tender option bonds. The common denominator of these new 
institutions was that they acted as banks, but were not regulated as such, further encouraging 






   
77.  This non-transparency was of even greater concern, as all institutions operating as part of 
the shadow banking system had in common that they borrowed in short-term, liquid markets, but 
invested in long-term illiquid assets. For example, structured investment vehicles were financed 
through short-term commercial paper and money market funds relied on short-term funds from 
investors. The vulnerabilities emanating from this severe maturity mismatch between assets and 
liabilities were compounded by the fact  that none of the institutions in the shadow banking 
                                                           
51 Gorton and Metrick (2010): “Regulating the Shadow Banking System.” Brookings Institution Press.  
52 Roubini and Mihm (2010): p. 76-80.   
Figure 45: Traditional and Shadow Banking Systems
Source: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011); Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Report.
Note: Shadow banking funding includes commercial paper and other short-term borrowing 
(bankers acceptances), repo, net securities loaned, liabilities of asset-backed securities issuers, and 


















system had access to a lender of last resort, nor to a deposit insurance system. As a result, the 
threat  from  bank  runs  for  the  viability  of  the  institution  significantly  increased,  a  fact  that 
explains the collapse of the shadow banking system in the wake of the crisis.   
 
78.  The vulnerabilities of the shadow banking system were not appreciated by the rating 
agencies—on account of three factors. First was the fact that a significant part of the transactions 
had been moved off-balance sheet  and therefore eluded the attention of the rating agencies.  
Second, ratings  agencies found it increasingly  difficult to assess the risk involved with new 
instruments,  and  resorted  to  mathematical  models  to  value  them  that  relied  on  optimistic 
assumptions minimizing measured risk.
53 Third, ratings were also skewed upward because rating 
agencies depended on the financial institution for employment and future contracts. As a result, 
excessive risk-taking was not recognized by rating agencies, effectively encouraging even riskier 
behavior.        
 
79.  Excessive risk-taking was further encouraged by a variety of moral hazard problems.  For 
instance, a trader would be rewarded for placing a bet on a CDO, but would not be punished if 
this bet failed. In addition, rather than simply paying employees a salary, the traders and bankers 
who  worked  at  the  investment  banks,  hedge  funds  and  other  financial  services  firms  were 
rewarded for their performance via a system of annual bonuses that consistently increased on an 
annual  basis.  These  bonuses  largely  depended  on  whether  the  returns  generated  by  the 
investment  exceeded  those  of  a  risk-appropriate  benchmark  (also  referred  to  as  ―alpha‖). 
Investment banks found that such returns were more likely if the investment was associated with 
tail risk that means with an event that was very unlikely to occur. However, it is in the nature of a 
tail risk event that the likelihood of it occurring increases exponentially when more and more 
individuals undertake actions that are based on the assumption that it will not occur.
54   
 
The Fed’s approach to bubbles—The Greenspan put  
80.  A  further  element  in  the  fabric  of  creating  a  flawed  governance  framework  was  the 
reluctance of the Fed to regulate markets. This tendency had already been apparent through the 
prompt actions the Fed had undertaken to limit the market crash in 1987 as well as the effects of 
the liquidity crunch in 1998, in both cases by cutting interest rates and pumping in liquidity.
55 
Monetary policy was considered not  to be sufficiently effective to control bubbles at a time of 
exuberant expectations. In a speech on risk and uncertainty in monetary policy, Greenspan 
(2004) said in reference to the technology bubble: ―Instead of trying to contain a putative bubble 
by drastic actions with largely unpredictable consequences, we chose, as we noted in our mid-
1999 congressional testimony, to focus on policies ‗to mitigate the fallout when it occurs, and 
                                                           
53 Roubini and Mihm (2010): p. 67.      
54 Rajan (2010): p. 136.  




hopefully ease the transition to the next expansion.‘‖ This conclusion was based on the view that 
the degree of uncertainty  about  the nature of the economic environment  in  which monetary 
policy was operating had significantly risen owing to a number of structural economic changes, 
in particular rising productivity. Consequently, Greenspan advocated an approach to monetary 
policy  that  basically  viewed  the  risks  of  intervention  in  potential  bubbles  to  significantly 
outweigh  the  benefits.  This  view  was  based  on  an  extremely  optimistic  assessment  of  the 
American economy and its long-term prospects driven by deep and positive structural change.  
 
81.  The Fed Chairman‘s statement that it was not possible to know a priori whether a bubble 
existed and it was therefore only possible to intervene ex post created the so-called ―Greenspan 
put‖, essentially a belief among traders that the government would always bail out traders that 
needed to be rescued after a bubble had burst, but not intervene to stop it from rising.
56 So, 
effectively the Fed was providing insurance against the possibility of a market crash, a situation 
referred to as ―meta moral hazard‖ by Miller, Weller and Zhang (2002).     
 
82.  Miller et al. cite evidence for such a meta moral hazard from: (i) a small survey of major 
fund managers and chief economists in London and New York carried out in early 2000 and (ii) 
a national opinion survey by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) of more than 
2,000 individual investors. The former investigated the hypothesis that ―confidence in an ever-
increasing stock market is due to the belief that monetary policy will be used to support the 
market and that corrections will elicit reductions in interest rates until the market turns around‖.  
The result was that respondents believed that the Fed reacted more to a fall of the stock market 
than to its rise, and all except two believed that this type of reaction was in part responsible for 
the high valuations on the U.S. market.
57 It was this rather asymmetric conduct of the monetary 
authorities that reduced the risk premium and played a key role in lifting the whole market.  It 
was as if investors came to believe that diversified equity instruments were insured subject to a 
deductible, i.e.,  with a market floor somewhat below current prices, but no ceiling.
58 In the 
particular case of the subprime market, the Fed refused to intervene in the market even after the 
Fed had received relevant warnings.
59 The subprime market was considered to be a good thing, 
the natural consequence of letting markets go free.  
 
83.  The system resulting from these financial innovations was characterized by (i) lack of 
transparency;  (ii)  underestimation  of  risk;  and  (iii)  lack  of  understanding  about  how  new 
                                                           
56 Financial Times, January 4, 2001.   
57 Cecchetti et al. (2000): p. 75.    
58 Miller, Weller and Zhang (2002) provide empirical evidence for a decline in the risk premium. Survey was 
conducted by the company Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).    
59 “For example, Bronx-based Fair Finance Watch commented to the Federal Reserve about the practices of 
now-defunct non-bank subprime lender New Century, when U.S. Bancorp bought warrants for 24% of New 
Century's stock. The Fed, rather than take any action on New Century, merely waited until U.S. Bancorp sold 





financial  products  might  behave  when  subjected  to  significant  stress.  The  conditions  above 
created a favorable environment for the housing and mortgage bubble to build. Essentially by 
injecting vast amounts of easy money into the economy and keeping it there for too long, the Fed 
muted the effect  of the collapse of the technology bubble by inflating an entirely new one. 
However, the critical condition for the global economic crisis to build as it did was the expansion 
of the subprime mortgage market.    
 
Subprime mortgage market 
84.  Policies  aimed  at  making  housing  mortgages  increasingly  available  for  low-income 
households had been pursued for a long time, but gained significant prominence in the early 
1990s. Steps toward operationalizing new low-income mortgage policies included the passing of 
the Federal Housing Safety and Soundness Act (1992), which aimed partly at reforming the 
regulation of the agencies and partly at promoting home-ownership for low–income and minority 
groups explicitly. In addition, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was 
asked to develop affordable housing goals for the agencies and monitor progress.
60 As discussed 
further below, lobbying by the financial sector s eems to have played a major role in bringing 
about legislative changes in support of lending to the subprime market.
61 Igan and Mishra (2011) 
explore the link between the political influence of the financial industry and financial regulation 
in the run-up to the global economic crisis and find strong evidence that spending on lobbying by 
the  financial industry and network connections between lobbyists and the legislators were 
positively linked to the probability of a legislator changing positions in favor of deregulation.           
 
 
85.  A key tool within the government‘s policy framework to promote lending to the subprime 
borrowers was Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Freddie and Fannie guaranteed an increasingly 
large  share  of  mortgage-backed  securities,  and  enjoyed  an  implicit  guarantee  by  the  U.S. 
Treasury. As a result, foreign investors treated these securities as almost equivalent to buying 
U.S. Treasury bills. From the start, both Freddie and Fannie were subject to loose supervision. 
The regulator was subject to congressional appropriation which ensured that any effort by the 
                                                           
60 Already in the mid-1990s HUD had loosened mortgage restrictions, so first-time buyers could qualify for 
loans that they were not able to get before.  In 1995, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae began receiving affordable 
housing credit for purchasing mortgage-backed securities, which included loans to low-income borrowers. As 
a result, the agencies began purchasing subprime securities. In 1996, HUD directed Freddie and Fannie to 
provide at least 42 percent of their mortgage financing to borrowers with income below the median in their 
area.   The target was further increased to 50 percent in 2000 and 52 percent in 2005.  In addition, HUD 
required Freddie and Fannie to provide 12 percent of their portfolio to “special affordable” loans (loans to 
borrowers with less than 60 percent of their area’s median income.  These targets increased over the years, 
with a 2008 target of 28 percent. In 2004, HUD increased the affordable housing goal from 50 to 56 percent.                 
61 Rajan (2010) argues that the expansion of lending to the subprime mortgage market was the result of 
rapidly growing income inequality.  However, there is little empirical evidence in support of a causal link 




regulator  to  enforce  quality  standards  could  result  in  budget  cuts  for  the  regulator.    The 
combination of an activist Congress, government-supported private firms and a weak regulator 
allowed for the subprime market to boom.   
 
86.  Importantly, as housing boomed, the agencies found the high rates available on low-
income  lending  particularly  attractive,  and  the  benign  environment  and  lack  of  historical 
experience  with  low-income  lending  allowed  them  to  ignore  the  additional  risk.    Under  the 
Clinton administration, HUD steadily increased the amount of funding it required the agencies to 
allocate to low-income housing.  Moreover, enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA),  which  had  already  been  enacted  in  1977,  was  sharply  enhanced  under  the  Clinton 
administration,
62 leading to further increases in mortgages to low -income segments of the 
population, especially in the highly visible and politically sensitive metropolitan areas where 
banks were most likely to be scrutinized.   
 
87.  The boom in the subprime market was further significantly ratcheted up under the Bush 
administration. The Bush administration pushed up the low-income lending mandate on Freddie 
and Fannie to 56 percent of their assets in 2004, even as the Fed started increasing interest rates 
and expressing worries about the housing boom.
63 One factor explaining the huge increase in 
lending in subprime mortgages was the concern by Freddie and Fannie about the impact of 
accounting scandals that had been exposed in 2004 and made them more pliant to Congress‘s 
demands for more low-income lending.
64 
 
88.  But  lending  from  government-sponsored  agencies  does  not  explain  the  boom  in  the 
subprime mortgage market that led to the real estate bubble whose burst was at the core of the  
global  financial  crisis.  As  more  money  from  government–sponsored  agencies  flooded  into 
financing or supporting low-income housing, real estate prices began to generate ever higher 
returns, while the new financial derivatives developed in the shadow banking system created the 
impression that risks associated with mortgage lending had fallen.  Perceptions of lower risk and 
higher returns in a booming real estate market—to a significant extent encouraged by the new 
financial derivatives—encouraged further expansion  of lending by the  private sector to  low-
income segments. In fact, while Freddie and Fannie played an important role in setting the stage 
for an expansion of the mortgage market to low-income households, by 2006, the vast majority 
of subprime mortgages  (84 percent) came from private lending institutions  and the share of 
subprime loans insured by Fannie and Freddie decreased as the bubble grew (from a high of 
                                                           
62 Bhutta (2008).       
63 Federal Register Vol. 69 (211). HUD’s Housing Goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Also, see HUD news 
release No. 04-133:  “HUD finalizes rule on new housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac”.  The new 
policy foresaw a target of lending to low- and moderate–income households of 56 percent by the year 2008.       
64 “The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report,” Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the 




insuring 44 percent in 2003 to insuring 22 percent of all subprime loans in 2005).
65 Mian and 
Sufi (2009) show that the number of mortgages obtained in a zip code was  negatively correlated 
with household income growth. At its prime in 2006, 25 million out of 55 million mortgages 
were  subprime  mortgages.
66 This vastly  expanding role of the private sector in providing 




89.  In addition, it was encouraged by a range of new government policies favoring lending to 
subprime borrowers. These policies had been catalyzed by lobbying of the financial sector which 
realized that policies aimed at expanding the mortgage market to low-income households would 
appeal to politicians representing low-income constituencies. An empirical study of the political 
economy of the subprime mortgage credit expansion carried out by Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2011) 
finds that special interests, as measured by campaign contributions from the mortgage industry 
and constituent interests, and measured by the share of subprime borrowers in a congressional 
district,  influenced  U.S.  government  policy  toward  the  housing  sector  during  the  subprime 
mortgage  credit  expansion  from  2002  to  2007.
68 Specifically, from 2002, mortgage industry 
campaign contributions increasingly targeted U.S. Representatives from districts with a large 
fraction of subprime borrowers. The researchers find evidence that both subprime mortgage 
lenders and subprime mortgage borrowers influenced government policy toward housing finance 
during  the  subprime  mortgage  credit  expansion.  While  the  empirical  evidence  shows  an 
influence of both factors, it does not  determine their relative weight,  i.e., whether the strong 
influence  of  constituents  from  low -income  households  or  the  campaign  contribut ions  by 
lobbyists were the key factors explaining the voting behavior of congressmen. However, given 
that the composition of congressmen‘s constituencies has been unchanged for a long time, while 
the support through lobbyists for key legislative changes peaked around 2003-2006, one may 
conclude that influence by lobbies representing the financial sector was the most important factor 




90.  The  subprime  mortgage  market  was  also  fuelled  by  both  public  and  private  sector 
investments from Germany, Japan, China and a range of emerging economies that had large 
                                                           
65 New York Times: October 4, 2008:   “Pressured to take risk, Fannie reached tipping point.”      
66 Mian and Sufi (2010).  
67 This is the so-called “Greenspan Put”. See also paragraph 80.    
68 Key legislation adopted by congress includes the American Dream Downpayment Act of 2003, which aimed 
to increase homeownership among low-income communities by providing down payment and closing cost 
assistance. In addition, a number of laws that would have prevented predatory lending and weakened 
protection by the government in the case of default were discussed, but never put up for votes, including the 
Responsible Lending Act of 2005, the Prohibit Predatory Lending Act of 2005 and the Federal Housing 
Finance Reform Act (2005).    
69 Rajan (2010) argued that it was the increasing income disparity since the 1990s that led politicians to 
expand the mortgage market to low-income households so as to obtain the low-income constituencies’ 




surplus savings as a result of the United States‘ current account deficits, as argued previously. 
Given that government debt had very low returns, the investment was mostly directed to the 
subprime market. Between 40 to 50 percent of the securities generated by American financial 
institutions were bought by foreigners.
 70 Investors‘ confidence was boosted by the high ratings 
assigned by rating agencies to instruments such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized 
debt obligations which securitized subprime mortgages and derived their value from mortgage 
payments and housing prices.     
 
91.  The U.S. financial system, especially the shadow banking system, was also a key element 
in the transmission of the crisis to  Ireland and Iceland. Prior to the crisis, both Iceland and 
Ireland had relied on the U.S. financial system for funds, usually in the form of short-term debt, 
foreign-owned bank deposits, or foreign-owned portfolio equity. Fuelled by a rapid expansion of 
credit, the housing markets of both countries began expanding in 2000, resulting in a boom in 
property investment and construction. The wealth effect from this boom spurred higher levels of 
consumption and helped sustain high growth rates. Boosted by the real estate boom, Ireland's 
banking system ballooned to five times the size of the economy, and its external debt to over 
1000 percent of GDP at the end of 2010.
71      
 
92.  When  in  the  wake  of  the  crisis  funds  from  the  U.S.  dried  up,  the  banking  system 
experienced a liquidity crunch, thus slowing credit to the real  estate market.  As borrowing 
became more expensive, the demand for housing started to decline, resulting in a fall in prices 
and an oversupply of housing.  This put pressure on the balance sheets of banks, many of which 
had  relied  extensively  on  profitable  mortgage  loans  to  boost  their  earnings.    The  bailout  or 
purchase of failing banks led to a crisis of confidence, leading to outflows of foreign assets in 
some  economies.  Figure  46  shows  how  many  nations,  in  particular  Ireland  and  Iceland, 
experienced  major  withdrawals  of  foreign-owned  funds.  The  crisis  exposed  Ireland's 
vulnerabilities to financial contagion. The collapse of Iceland preceded that of Ireland by a few 
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93.  To summarize, U.S. housing, monetary and fiscal policies were at the core of the U.S. 
low savings rates and the asset bubble in the real estate market.  This asset bubble fuelled an 
extended consumption boom and rising current account deficits, which could be financed as a 
result  of  the  reserve  currency  status  of  the  U.S.  dollar  and  were  the  key  driver  for  global 
imbalances. Housing policies were influenced by the financial sector, which realized that the 
subprime market offered extensive opportunities for higher profits. The financial deregulation 
and  low  interest  rates  brought  about  by  the  Federal  Reserve‘s  monetary  policy  fostered 
expansion  and  innovation  of  the  financial  sector.  Increasingly  complex  financial  derivatives 
allowed the risks associated with the new instruments to be underestimated. When the housing 
bubble burst, this had significant implications for the U.S. financial system as a whole.   
 
94.  The so-called global savings glut brought about by economic policies of China and other 
East Asian countries was not the cause of low interest rates and the financial innovation boom. In 
fact, it was the excess liquidity created by countries with a reserve currency, in particular the 
United States through its expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, as well as housing policies 
that led to the U.S. current account deficits and to global imbalances. With the U.S. dollar being 
the  main  reserve  currency,  the  reserves  held  by  the  central  banks  of  surplus  countries  will 
primarily be invested in U.S. dollar assets.  But what has been the role of China‘s policies and its 










































IV.  Why Did China’s Surplus Increase So Much?
73 
 
95.  The large increase in China‘s current account surplus in general and with the U.S. in 
particular has attracted much attention. In this section, we will argue that these were caused by 
both the high corporate saving rate in China as a result of its dual track approach to reform and 
the relocation of the labor-intensive tradable sector of East Asian economies to China, which 
started in the 1980s but accelerated after China‘s accession to WTO in 2001.  
 
96.  First,  China‘s  large  current  account  surplus  reflects  its  high  savings  relative  to  its 
investment rates. Chinese savings and investment rates have been extremely high in recent years. 
With its current account surplus in excess of 0.5 percent of global GDP since 2005, China has 
accumulated foreign reserves in excess of the total reserves held by all other industrial countries 
combined.   
 
97.  Breaking  down  savings  into  household  and  corporate  savings  shows  that,  while 
household savings are at a high level, they broadly correspond to those of other Asian countries, 
such  as  India.  The  distinctive  feature  explaining  very  high  savings  in  China  are  corporate 
savings.  China‘s corporate savings rate is significantly above that of other Asian countries and 
other emerging markets. At about 20 percent of GDP—double the share of corporate savings in 
the U.S. and France—retained earnings finance more than one-half of enterprise investment. 
What explains the high savings rates in China‘s corporate sector?
74         
 
98.  One of the main factors behind the high savings rates of China‘s corporate sector is the 
fact that China did not carry out all the necessary reforms at the same time. And those sectors 
that  have  not  been  reformed  still  have  distortions  which  turned  into  unfavorable  income 
distribution and concentration of wealth in the large state and private-owned enterprises. It is this 
income distribution and large concentration of wealth in the corporate sector that is an important 
factor behind the high savings rate in China (Lin 2011).  
 
99.  Since the 1990s,  income disparity in  China has  become larger  and larger.  Figure 47 
shows the evolution  of income inequality in  rural  and urban areas  and  nationally for China 
during  1980-2000.
75  While  China  has  a ttained  significant  progress  against  poverty  (the 
proportion of the population living in poverty fell from 53 percent to 8 percent during 1981 -
2001
76), income inequality has increased over the years —although not continuously—in rural 
and urban areas as well as in China as a whole. In general, the marginal propensity to consume of 
low-income  people  is  higher;  whereas  the  marginal  propensity  to  consume  of  high-income 
people is lower. Therefore, if wealth is concentrated among high-income people, they will not 
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consume as much, saving more and turning savings into investment. On the other hand, low-
income people have a high marginal propensity to consume, but do not have enough funds. This 






100.  What is the origin of the increase in income disparity and concentration of wealth in the 
large corporate sector in China? Income disparity and high corporate savings in China can be 
explained  by  three  components  of  its  current  economic  structure:  the  financial  sector,  the 
resource  sector,  and  monopolies  in  the  telecommunications  and  financial  sectors.  Figure  48 
shows the evolution of saving in China from 1995 to 2006. Total savings as a share of GDP were 
below 40 percent until 2003. Household savings were high, but still were not very different from 
other countries such as India. But since 2004, savings increased significantly. This discrete jump 
was mainly driven by the hike in corporate savings.
77 Four reasons explain this development.    
                                                           






















Figure 47: Income Inequality in China
Rural Urban National







101.  First, large state-owned enterprises have kept their profits as corporate savings.
78 In 1994, 
during the reform of taxation, a decision was taken that the government would not collect profit 
from SOEs for an unspecified period of time.  In this context,  a number of factors may ha ve 
played a role. For one, this decision seemed a natural extension of the logic prevailing in SOE 
reform in the 1980s, which emphasized the independence of SOEs from the government. Second, 
the central theme of SOE reform during 1992 -1994 was to increase  managerial autonomy and 
reduce government intervention, as was evident in the State Council decision on ―Regulation on 
Transformation of Management Mechanisms of SOEs‖ in 1992. Collecting dividends from SOEs 
would appear naturally as moving in the opposite direction.  Third, without corporatization and 
some  minimum  progress  in  corporate  governance,  it  would  be  practically  difficult  for  the 
government to determine an acceptable rate of dividend without reopening the negotiation with 
the management of each SOE on profit division.  Fourth, SOEs as a whole were in a poor 
financial situation in early 1990s. What the government could collect was not much, while the 
need for new capital injection was perceived as urgent and large. In 1994, the total profit of 
industrial SOEs was only 1.8 percent of GDP, which compared with 3.3 percent of GDP in 2003. 
 
102.  Second, China‘s financial structure is dominated by four big state-owned banks (Figure 
49). Those big banks and China‘s equity market only provide access to financial services to large 
enterprises, either owned by the state or by wealthy individuals. Small and medium enterprises, 
which are very labor intensive, do not have access to any financial services.
79 This situation 
generates two implications for income distributi on. On the one hand, China has an abundant 
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labor  force,  but  the  development  of  labor-intensive  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  is 
repressed because they do not have access to financial services. As their growth is repressed, 
fewer job opportunities will be available, dampening wages in China. For poor people, the only 
source of income, other than transfers, is their own labor. The financial structure artificially 
reduces these job opportunities as well as wages, lowering the income of low-income people.  
 
 
Table 1: Chinese Interest Rates on Debt 
 
2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
State Owned Enterprises  2.46  2.23  2.67  2.86  2.61 
Private Enterprises  4.84  4.64  4.61  3.81  4.57 
Difference  -2.38  -2.41  -1.94  -0.95  -1.96 
Source: Ferri and Liu (2009). 
 
103.  The World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in 2004 provides further evidence for the 
concentration  of  lending.  While  among  large  firms,  65  percent  had  a  loan  from  a  bank  or 
financial institution, only 32 percent of medium-sized firms and 20 percent of small firms had a 
loan. Reflecting this lack of bank finance, many of the non-state sectors face a high degree of 
credit constraints and have to resort to the informal lending market. Also, survey data from the 
IFC for China (Investment Climate Surveys Draft Country Profile-2003) show that SMEs are 
less reliant on banks for financing and more reliant on informal sources. 
 
104.  The highly concentrated financial structure also artificially lowers the cost of credit and 
capital, acting as a subsidy to those enterprises with access to financial services (Table 1). The 
































Figure 49: Total Financial Assets of China





borrow from them, the relatively poor. Therefore, the financial structure is in effect asking the 
poor people to subsidize the investment of rich people or large corporations. This exacerbates the 
skewed income disparity and concentration of income in large corporations in China. 
 
105.  Third, the low royalty levy on natural resources boosts corporate savings. In particular, 
due to the scarcity of natural resources in China, their prices are relatively high. However, the 
Chinese  government  imposes  little  royalty  levy  on  these  resources.  Domestic  and  foreign 
petroleum companies are exempt from royalty taxes on crude oil for levels of production less 
than 1 million tons. For crude oil production above this threshold, taxes range from 4 percent to 
12.5 percent depending on the level of production. Royalty rates for natural gas are much lower: 
Companies are exempt from taxes for natural gas production less than 2 billion cubic meters, and 
pay taxes at rates of 1 to 3 percent for larger volumes.
80  To put this into perspective, the United 
States requires payment of royalties at a rate of 12.5 percent for onshore crude oil and natural gas 
production, and 16.7 percent for offshore production, regardless of the amount of the resource 
being extracted.
81  It is clear that state-owned and private mining companies  in China benefit 
greatly from the low royalty payments. Thus, this also leads to a transfer  of wealth to a small 
group of people.  
 
106.  Fourth, monopoly power in financial institutions and in the telecommunications industry 
makes these industries extremely profitable, with only a limited number of people having access 
to  these monopoly rents.  For example, the top five banks  in  China have experienced a 536 
percent increase in profits in the past 7 years, recording RMB 545 billion in profits in 2010.  
Notably, the Agricultural Bank of China enjoyed an impressive 4,838 percent increase in profits 
during this period (Figure 50).  In the telecommunications sector, China Mobile has had a 24-
fold increase in profits during the past decade (Figure 51), and maintains a market share of 69.3 
percent.
82  Since the ‗抓大放小‘- reforms
83 SOE‘s have not been required to pay out dividends to 
their shareholders. With industrial profits increasing to trillions of RMB (Figure 52), corporate 
savings have increased as well. These are the four most important sources explaining the high 
rate of savings in China. 
 
                                                           
80 These rates are stipulated in the “Provisional Regulations on the Payment by Sino-Foreign Cooperative 
Joint Ventures of Royalties for the Exploitation of Onshore Oil Resources,” updated last in 1995. 
81 American Petroleum Institute, “The Facts about the U.S. Royalty Collection System.” June 6, 2011. 
82 China Mobile Limited Annual Report 2010, pg 3. 
83 A broad term meaning “grasping the big, letting go of the small” which refers to the reforms described 



























Figure 50: Profits for the 5 Largest State-owned Chinese Banks
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China China Construction Bank

























Figure 51: Profits for China Mobile







107.  This analysis suggests that without addressing the root causes of income disparity and 
corporate savings in China, consumption will be hard to increase, and excess savings and the 
large current account surplus would be hard to eliminate. In order to tackle its current account 




108.  Corporate governance should be strengthened and dividend policies reviewed with a 
view to lowering retained earnings by enterprises. Requiring state-owned enterprises to issue 
dividends  would  reduce  their  retained  earnings  and  possibly  also  increase  households‘ 
consumption.  
 
109.  Financial sector reform:  With a view to improving access by SMEs to credit, more 
competition needs to be introduced in the banking system, possibly by strengthening banking 
supervision, imposing a minimum share of large banks‘ loans granted to SMEs, and liberalizing 
the entry of small local banks. At this point, large corporations have access to loans at subsidized 
rates, but do not pay dividends.  
 
110.  Royalty rates for coal companies and gas and other minerals:  Earnings are extremely 
high, but royalty levels are low.  Therefore, royalties on state-owned and private enterprises 
should be increased.   
                                                           





















Figure 52: Chinese Real Industrial Sector Profits 
Sources: CEIC; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development national accounts data; 
UBS; and World Bank national accounts data.




111.  The current account balance of a country reflects its savings-investment balance. The 
above analysis explains China‘s large current account surplus. The reasons for the large and 
growing trade imbalance between the U.S. and China were, however, mainly the relocation of 
many  of  the  low  value-added  labor-intensive  products  from  other  East  Asian  economies  to 
China. The U.S. has long had a trade deficit with East Asia because of imports of labor-intensive 
products. This relocation concentrates the trade surplus of East Asia with the U.S. on China, 
which can be observed in the changing patterns of the United States‘ trade deficits with Japan 




112.  This  relocation  as  well  as  the  regional  integration  through  production  networks  also 
caused China‘s trade deficit with other East Asian economies. Figure 54 illustrates the rising 
importance of China in U.S. imports from East Asia. Related to this, Figure 29 above shows how 
China‘s  trade  balance  with  other  East  Asian  economies  deteriorated,  as  China  increasingly 
imported raw materials and semi-finished products from these countries. Many subcomponents 
of these commodities are produced in advanced countries and assembled in China, as a result of 
relocation of labor-intensive production to China.  Figure 55 shows the decomposition of the 
production of an iPhone assembled in China, which illustrates the small share of value added in 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. International Trade Commission.
*Simple manufactured products correspond to SITC Revision 4 codes 6 and 81–85, covering 

























V.  Concluding Remarks 
 
113.  The global financial crisis caused the greatest crisis in the global economy since the Great 
Depression.  Through  the  coordinated  efforts  of  the  G20  countries,  the  world  economy  has 
avoided the worst possible scenario. However, the world economy remains fragile as a result of 
high  unemployment  and  large  excess  capacity  in  the  advanced  economies,  high  levels  of 
sovereign debt and the crisis in the Euro-zone. What are some of the key findings and lessons to 
be learned from the global financial crisis?   
 
114.  First, this paper concludes that the global imbalance and the real estate asset bubble in the 
United States were largely brought about by U.S. domestic policy. The loose monetary policy 
that started in 2001 after the ―dot-com‖ bubble burst, magnified by the financial deregulation and 
the subsequent various financial innovations, resulted in an exuberant boom in the U.S. housing 
market. The wealth effect from the housing boom and the financial innovation that allowed 
households to capitalize their gains in housing prices led to U.S. households‘ overconsumption 
and over indebtedness. The U.S.‘s large current account deficit, made possible by its reserve 
currency status, was a result of both the households‘ over-consumption and the public debts due 
to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.        
 
115.  Second, the analysis shows that whether a policy is successful should not be judged only 
by its immediate effects but also its longer-term and overall effects. The use of monetary policy 
to cope with the recession brought out by the burst of the ―dot-com‖ bubble in 2001 could have 
been justifiable. However, with hindsight the policy was overused and extended for too long. 
Moreover, when the symptom of a problem appears, it is important to have a good analysis of the 
real cause of the problem. If in 2003 when the global imbalance, or specifically the U.S. trade 
deficit, first became an issue the attention was to understand the reasons for the U.S.‘s over- 
demand instead of pointing the finger to other countries for the U.S.‘s trouble, the exuberant 
boom in the U.S. housing market could have been restrained and the financial regulation in the 
U.S. could have been tightened much earlier. The global crisis could have been avoided or at 
least its adverse effect could have been reduced.  
 
116.  Third, any new policy initiative needs to be evaluated from both its positive effects and 
potential risk and negative effects. The crisis highlights the risks emanating from uncontrolled 
financial deregulation.  The subprime mortgage crisis,  as  well as  the collapse of the shadow 
banking  system,  illustrates  the  risks  of  lack  of  supervision  of  new  financial  instruments. 
Developing countries need to be vigilant in adopting appropriate levels of banking supervision 
that will prevent a recurrence of such a crisis. Most fundamentally, financial instruments and 
their interaction with one another need to be fully understood before they should be adopted.  
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